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I. Introduction
In recent years, the rationale of most welfare programs has been the subject
of intense political debate, not only in the United States but also in European
countries (e.g., Germany, Sweden, and France) with well-established welfare
systems. New global economic challenges and grim demographic trends pre-
sent political leaders and workers with the difficult task of balancing govern-
ment budgets while maintaining elaborate welfare programs. The prevailing
opinion is that welfare has a negative impact on economic growth because
of the disincentives it creates for the working population. Nevertheless, social
scientists have often overlooked the political ramifications of welfare spending
and its impacts on a country’s income distribution. In this article, we argue
that the level of welfare spending is fundamentally a political decision and,
therefore, conditional on the sociopolitical and demographic structures pre-
vailing within a country.
Although extensive research shows effects of the size of income distri-
bution on growth and vice versa, studies that examine how income distribution
and welfare spending affect each other at different levels of economic de-
velopment are almost nonexistent. Moreover, the existing literature does not
seem to test adequately the hypothesis that demographic change affects the
distribution of resources within each society.1
Our point of departure is the contention that welfare transfers represent
political choices. Specifically, they are the outcomes of a government’s stra-
tegic choices to seek support by rewarding the interest groups critical for the
government’s survival. In this article we argue that governments choose to
reallocate resources to increase their probability of remaining in office. More-
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over, we explore the interrelationship between income inequality and welfare
transfers by focusing on how governments choose to combine growth-en-
hancing policies with political strategies to maintain political stability. We
conceptualize the emergence of welfare institutions as a necessary response
to the underlying social and economic structures that delineate governmental
choices.
The article is divided into five sections. Section II reviews competing
theories on the welfare state and income distribution by exploring the dynamics
between income distribution and welfare transfers and incorporating the effects
of demographic changes. Section III presents the article’s theoretical argument.
Section IV defines and describes the applied variables and the expected re-
lations. Discussion and analysis of the results follow in Section VI. Finally,
Section V suggests issues for future research.
II. Conceptualizing Welfare State and Income Inequality
The core of the Western welfare state has been political and social security
and equality.2 In the modern welfare state, social security has been associated
with the expansion of social rights and comprehensive social citizenship.3
Both elements of the political system are associated with social inclusion. The
social welfare state distributes either direct funds or services in kind to secure
the working class from contingencies such as involuntary unemployment,
sickness, injuries, maternal or family leaves of absence, and old-age retirement.
Despite the popular view that welfare payments mainly assist the poor, these
payments are only a small portion of government transfers. Thus, in many
cases, the term “social security spending” is preferred to “welfare state” so
as to delineate the role of social security to maintain minimum income level.4
One of the primary objectives of welfare programs is redistribution with
a view to promoting equality and social justice. It is presumed that the state
can intervene to redistribute resources to reduce inequality. The state is thus
the only institutional mechanism in modern society capable of providing a
form of collective intervention for demanding entitlements; it has the authority
and the power to ensure that the redistribution is effected.
The two other objectives of the welfare state—efficiency and consensus
building—are separable from redistribution. Efficiency becomes pertinent be-
cause of market imperfections (e.g., adverse selection and externalities). Social
unity or consensus building, through which the welfare state becomes a con-
tributing factor to social integration, is one of the initial objectives of the
welfare state.5
There are four possible domains of redistributive policies. First, the state
can choose to promote greater equality or follow a minimum standard to
prevent segments of the population from falling below socially acceptable
levels of living (e.g., housing, health care, and level of education). Another
domain is the range of the beneficiaries and segments of society. The third
domain differentiates the means to achieve redistribution (providing services
such as medical care at schools) from the impact of policies on specific
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variables (e.g., health and food sufficiency). In the fourth domain, redistrib-
utive policies are divided between those that emphasize access and equality
of opportunity (e.g., education) and those that focus on the amount of service
on demand.6
Many have regarded the emergence of the welfare state as the result of
increasing industrialization and democratization and the consequent altered
socioeconomic structures. It reflected the transition from autocracy to de-
mocracy, in which the protection of social rights was parallel to the provision
of political and civil rights. Because of an increasing demand for socioeco-
nomic security, the role of the state has been modified to secure a constant
flow of social services rather than providing emergency relief. Governments
employ three channels to pursue the desired goals of the welfare state: transfer
payments, direct provision of services in kind, and tax credits for the working
population.7 There are four primary societal developments accounting for the
necessary conditions that give rise to the welfare state: demographic changes,
the decline of rural populations (urbanization) because of industrialization,
bureaucratization, and expansion of political and social rights.8
The modernization approach is an extension of the industrialization thesis,
combining economic conditions with political factors. The growth of the wel-
fare state is associated with the evolutionary change of society to complex
and developed forms. Modernization generates specialization and fragmen-
tation in society. In highly differentiated societies, citizenship is the integrative
mechanism of the society.9 The modernization approach considers the welfare
state to be the outgrowth of two processes: the development of the industrial
society and the emergence of mass democracy with universal political and
social citizenship. Because of the complexity of the applied models in the
modernization literature, empirical research, with few exceptions, is limited.10
The next section develops a positive political theory of welfare transfers.
Such a theory argues that welfare transfers are political choices that aim at
increasing the probability of the incumbent remaining in power. We concep-
tualize this argument by examining the relationships between welfare transfers
and different types of government change.
III. The Welfare State, Income Inequality, and Political Stability
A government engages in redistribution for two possible reasons. Either it
seeks to improve its odds of remaining in power or it desires to facilitate the
participation of various segments of the population in the larger economic
and social life. For instance, unemployment benefits allow unemployed people
to remain active economically, if on a limited basis. We believe that the second
goal is rather unimportant to a government unless political benefits arise from
such policy choices. We argue that welfare transfers may actually increase
income inequality, as the governing elite uses redistribution as a political tool
to remain in office.11
Political violence is the intervening variable that explains why govern-
ments even care to redistribute resources. Though income inequality tends to
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reduce economic growth, the political interest of governments rests with the
maintenance of their political power.12 Hence, resource redistribution can be
essential in satisfying groups whose support is critical to the political survival
of a government.13 State actors have their own interests in promoting welfare
programs. The political elite seeks reelection, and welfare programs provide
them with popular support.
The recent work of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph
M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith shows that a government can redistribute two
types of goods: public goods that are enjoyed by all members of the society
and private goods that are distributed exclusively to the members of the pivotal
group sustaining the government in power.14 Different types of political regimes
have different structures in terms of the size and composition of a winning
coalition necessary to sustain a government. For instance, authoritarian regimes
require a small winning coalition to remain in power as compared with the
coalition of democratic regimes. Hence, the former primarily favor the redis-
tribution of private goods, while the latter favor a mixture of both private and
public goods as essential to maintaining political power. The present article is
an important extension of this finding. Our focus is that while the consensus-
building function of the welfare state becomes extremely pertinent in the minds
of the political elite, welfare programs do not necessarily target the most needy
segments of the population but, rather, the ones critical for the regime’s political
survival. In this connection, we examine the joint relationships among welfare
transfers, income distribution, and some very specific forms of government
change. Furthermore, we argue that demographic changes leading to an increase
in the dependent population may alter who absorbs resources within the society
and, therefore, that the demographic profile of those supporting the regime
modifies the choices of resource redistribution.
In this article, we argue that governments redistribute resources with the
hope that the probability of their political survival will increase. As a result,
income inequality is unlikely to decrease; on the contrary, we believe that it
may increase. There are two major reasons. First, the horizon of the political
strategy to remain in office is short, while the reduction of income inequality
takes a fairly long period of time. Second, the rationale of redistribution lies
primarily in political rewards to the interest groups whose support is essential
to a government holding on to its office. The beneficiaries tend to be those
who have already been awarded by government redistribution and further
transfers to them are needed for the government to remain in office, which
increases wealth inequality. In the long run, growing unequal wealth distri-
bution fertilizes the ground for the kind of profound political change that
leads to the downfall of governments.
For the purposes of this article, we focus on three types of government
change to denote political stability or instability: minor regular government
change, major regular government change, and irregular government change.
Major regular government change occurs when a party of a different ideology
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gains office within the constitutional framework. The change in Britain’s
political scenery following Tony Blair’s Labour Party winning the election is
an example of a major regular government change. Irregular government
change refers to unconstitutional government change. It indicates a funda-
mental change of the political system. The power transfer from President
Salvador Allende to General Augusto Pinochet, or from the Shah Pahlavi to
Ayatollah Khomeini, are classic examples of this kind of government change.
Minor regular government change implies that the same ruling party remains
in office without significant ramifications for the chosen policies. The People’s
Action Party in Singapore, the United Malays National Organization in Ma-
laysia, and the Liberal Democracy Party in Japan provide relevant examples
of minor regular government change. In light of our central theoretical ar-
gument, welfare transfers should improve the odds of the same party remaining
in power, reduce the likelihood of fundamental political change, and decrease
the probability of incumbents losing office in an electoral environment. These
theoretical statements can be summarized in the following four hypotheses,
which we test statistically in the following section:
Hypothesis 1. Welfare transfers increase the levels of income inequality.
Hypothesis 2. Welfare transfers decrease the probability of irregular
government change.
Hypothesis 3. Welfare transfers increase the probability of minor regular
government change.
Hypothesis 4. Welfare transfers decrease the probability of major reg-
ular government change.
IV. Research Design and Data Specification
To test these hypotheses, we define the following specification:
P p g G z D a X  e ,1 p1 p1 p1 p1 1
P p g G z D a X  e ,2 p2 p2 p2 p2 2
P p g G z D a X  e ,3 p3 p3 p3 p3 3
Gp g P z D a X  m,g g g g
and
Dp g P z G a X  v ,d d d d i
where of irregular government change, ofP p probability P p probability1 2
major regular government change, of minor regular govern-P p probability3
ment change, spending, distribution, redeter-Gp welfare Dp income Xp p
mined variables (which include older population, urbanization, government ca-
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pacity, economic growth, initial levels of development, political rights, educa-
tion attainment, and initial levels of political stability), and e, m, and r-v p ei
ror terms.
For the joint estimation of the five equations, including both developed
and developing countries, a sample of 72 countries was selected.15 The esti-
mation is through the three-stage least-squares method (3SLS), which gen-
eralizes the two-stage least-squares method (2SLS) to take into account the
correlations between equations. It requires three steps: first, calculate the 2SLS
estimates of the identified equations; second, use the 2SLS estimates to es-
timate the structural equation errors and then use these to estimate the con-
temporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the structural equation errors;
and third, apply generalized least squares to the large equation representing
all the identified equations of the system. The 3SLS estimator is consistent
and, in general, is asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS estimator. If
the disturbances in the different equations are uncorrelated, so that the con-
temporaneous variance-covariance matrix of the the structural equations’ dis-
turbances is diagonal, 3SLS reduces to 2SLS.16 The range of time for the
endogenous variables in our article is from 1970 to 1990, a period determined
by the availability of the data.
Endogenous Variables
Income distribution. Various indices of income distribution have been used
in the literature. They include the Gini coefficient, the top- or bottom-income
quintile share, the ratio of the top- to bottom-income quintile shares, or the
summation of the middle-income quintile shares. These indices are quite
highly correlated. The result of using any one of them can usually be replicated
consistently by using the others. This study uses the Gini coefficient because
it captures the general level of income inequality. Klaus Deininger and Lyn
Squire compiled the original data set for this variable.17 They address the
problems that most of the previous data sets exhibit and expand the acceptable
observations that are taken from primary surveys and official statistical doc-
uments. To compensate for the lack of observations within countries, they
apply information on land holdings as a proxy for initial income distribution,
thus increasing the sample of countries that can be studied.
Welfare transfers. Various indicators have been adopted to measure
welfare programs. Some studies use government expenditures, exclusive of
military and educational expenditures. Other studies focus on health care, social
insurance transfers, and pensions. Still others look at education expenditures
only.18 It should be noted that government expenditures include expenditures
that do not belong to welfare transfers (i.e., health expenditures, housing, ag-
riculture, transportation, and public investment). Although these government
expenditures consist of the distribution of public goods, they do not target income
contingencies.
To capture the characteristics of welfare programs, as they are analyzed
in this study, social security and welfare transfers stand as the most appropriate
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indicators. Social security and welfare transfers are short-term reallocations
of resources that can be used conveniently for political purposes by helping
incumbents remain in office. To measure the magnitude of the welfare state,
this study focuses on the level of expenditures on welfare transfers and social
security.19
The data are from the Government Financial Statistics (GFS) by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF defines social security as “trans-
fers in cash or in kind to protect the entire population or specific segments
of it against certain social risk,” which is “an event or circumstance that may
adversely affect the welfare of the households concerned either by imposing
additional demands on their resources or by reducing their incomes.”20 Social
security expenditures consist of pensions and retirement benefits. Welfare
transfers are “transfers payable to household to meet the . . . needs as social
insurance benefits but which are not made under a social insurance scheme.”21
Here, we use the ratio of welfare transfers and social security to GDP.22
Political instability. The three kinds of government change are all
discrete phenomena. To account for the relationship between the all-or-nothing
nature of the transfer of executive power and the relativity of political insta-
bility, we use the limited dependent variable estimation method. This method
defines the probability of government change as a continuous variable, char-
acterized as a function of economic and political conditions.
The explanatory variables in the logit model fall into four broad classes.
Economic variables are included to measure the recent economic performance
of the government, political behavior variables account for significant political
events that may lead to a government change, political institution variables
reflect political structures and systems, and continent dummy variables control
for regional factors. From the fitted values of the logit model using the pooled
time-series and cross-country data, the probability of a government change
for each country is estimated. There are three aggregate probabilities: irregular
government change, major regular government change, and minor regular
government change. The probability variables thus created have been used in
recent publications to study economic performance and demographic change.23
Predetermined Variables
The predetermined variables in our model include demographic, economic,
and political variables. The demographic variables are the ratio of the pop-
ulation over age 65 to the total population and the ratio of urban population
to the total population. The range of the data is from 1970 to 1990. All
demographic data are gathered from the World Population Perspectives and
The World Data of Social and Economic Information.24
The economic variables are those that the literature indicates as deter-
minants of income distribution. They are the real GDP per capita for 1970
(to avoid problems of endogeneity), the square of real GDP per capita, and
the rate of economic growth. These variables are obtained or calculated from
the data set compiled by Robert Summers and Alan Heston in 1995.25 The
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range of the data is from 1970 to 1990. We also include in the specification
secondary school enrollment, which is an indicator for human capital accu-
mulation. For developing countries, in particular, high levels of secondary
school enrollment are critical for building the necessary human capital for
economic growth.26 Enrollment data are applied as a proxy for the flow of
investment in human capital. The data used in this study are from the R. Barro
and J.-W. Lee data set, which is an adaptation of the Unesco statistics on
educational attainment.27
The political variables include the lack of political rights, the level of
political extraction, and the initial levels of the probabilities of government
change. The political rights variable is from the Freedom House, and it is
ranked from one (highest degree of liberty) to seven (the lowest).28 The criteria
for political rights include the meaningfulness of elections for the executive
and legislative branches, the voting power of the electorate, significant op-
position competition, decentralization of political power, the attempts of po-
litical agents to reach a consensus on major political issues, and minority self-
determination.29 All these indicators measure the power that the electorate and
the various interest groups have to express their political opinions and de-
mands. The data range from 1970 to 1990.
Political capacity is a composite measurement of the government’s ca-
pacity to reach the population and execute its policy. It conceptualizes how
capable the government is of extracting resources from the population such
that the chosen policy goal of the government can be realized. A capable
government is also able to marginalize or neutralize domestic opposition
through its taxation policy.30 Here we adopt the measure used by Jacek Kugler
and Marina Arbetman, who operationalize political capacity based on the
difference between the economically expected performance of the government
in collecting taxes and the actual tax collection resulting from political power.31
The ratio is estimated from 1960 to 1992. Finally, initial levels of political
instability are also included to control for political violence, which existed at
the beginning of the period of the study.
V. Empirical Results and Analysis
The Transfer-Inequality–Irregular-Change Nexus
The result in table 1 indicates that welfare transfers can be useful political
and policy tools for a government working to prevent cataclysmic regime
change, even at the cost of income inequality. In plain words, welfare transfers
decrease the probability of unconstitutional government change. Therefore, a
government can use welfare as a means of prolonging its tenure.
The positive effect of welfare transfers on income inequality might be
the result of governments responding to specific groups that have more po-
litical clout than others. This result is consistent with our earlier positive,
rather than normative, argument that the rationale of welfare transfers is po-
litical and not ideological. Transfers are handed out not because a society is
unequal but because the government seeks to maximize social support so that
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TABLE 1
Welfare, Income Inequality, and Government Change
Welfare
Income
Inequality
Minor
Regular
Change
Major
Regular
Change
Irregular
Change
Welfare … 177.85**
(2.543)
1.370*
(2.402)
1.262
(.867)
1.639*
(2.463)
Income inequality .002
(1.104)
… .003
(.598)
.009
(.954)
.006
(1.669)
Minor change .216
(1.719)
78.865**
(5.404)
… 1.085
(1.526)
.728*
(2.555)
Major regular change .035
(.499)
8.05
(.595)
.137
(.924)
… .332
(1.851)
Irregular change .051
(.456)
22.829
(1.302)
.033
(.115)
.438
(.813)
…
Intercept .161
(1.895)
60.853**
(11.891)
.256
(1.154)
.45
(.958)
.303
(1.480)
Initial minor change … … .422*
(2.083)
… …
Initial major change … … … .313**
(3.141)
…
Initial irregular change … … … … .340**
(3.734)
Population, 65 .882**
(7.465)
172.43**
(3.156)
1.119
(1.957)
2.212
(1.431)
1.907**
(2.958)
Urbanization .0003*
(2.064)
… … … …
RPE .009
(.912)
… .014
(.616)
.059
(1.094)
.051**
(2.541)
Growth … 18.845
(.929)
.508
(1.383)
.074
(.156)
.269
(.937)
GDP, 70 … .534
(1.295)
… … …
Political rights … .459
(1.122)
… … …
Enrollment, 70 … 3.762**
(3.156)
… … …
Note.—Population, 65 p population that is age 65 or older (%); RPE p relative political
extraction; GDP, 70 p real GDP per capita in 1970; Enrollment, 70 p enrollment rate in 1970.
Weighted R2: 0.766; weighted MSE: 2.364. Table 1 presents the results from three-stage least
squares estimation. Unlike two-stage least squares estimation, three-stage typically uses system-
weighted MSE and system-weighted R2 to measure the fit of the joint model, which are obtained
by stacking all the models together and performing a single regression with the stacked obser-
vations weighted by the inverse of the model error variance.
 Significant at .10 level.
* Significant at .05 level.
** Significant at .001 level.
it can remain in office. The result is also consistent with the selectorate theory
by Bueno de Mesquita et al., that governing leaders transfer wealth to their
winning coalition members in order to remain in power.32 This result may
actually increase, rather than decrease, wealth disparities.33
It should be noted, however, that the effect of income inequality on
irregular government change is positive and significant at the 0.10 level. While
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the direct effect of transfers on irregular government change is negative—more
transfers lead to a lower probability of being overthrown—its indirect effect
on government change through income inequality is positive, which is to say,
more transfers lead to higher inequality, resulting in a higher degree of political
instability. The positive indirect effect of welfare transfers on irregular gov-
ernment change is, however, only marginally significant. The lack of major
impact of income distribution on irregular government change in this nexus
is consistent with the argument that the causality between income inequality
and political instability is only tentative and dependent on other factors. Such
factors may include demographic structures, political mobilization, cultural
values, the balance between civil society and state power, and the stability of
political institutions.34 Therefore, governments may actually use welfare trans-
fers to prolong their tenure at the cost of income inequality. Although income
inequality may also increase the probability that the government is overthrown,
such probability is not salient compared with the benefits brought about by
welfare transfers in terms of consolidating support for the government in the
short run.
In the literature on political instability, income inequality is considered
one of the possible explanations for civil unrest. Some evidence shows that
the poorest countries with the highest levels of inequality tend to be politically
unstable as well. The reason is that poor countries are not able to generate
enough wealth to satisfy the needs of all the society’s members.
Nevertheless, the causal link between income inequality and political
instability is tentative. By itself, income inequality cannot fully explain in-
cidents of political violence or the lack thereof. Arguably, income inequality
is the necessary condition, but hardly the sufficient one, to cause political
instability. This is critical to understanding governmental choices in redis-
tributing resources. Since income inequality will not always lead to political
instability, particularly in the short run, governments choose to provide private
goods to the groups essential for their political survival. Government policy
that leads to the relocation of resources to the groups that support them the
most can result in an elevation of levels of income inequality. In the long
run, this choice can be self-defeating if redistribution accentuates income
inequality beyond what is socially acceptable.
The Transfer-Inequality–Minor-Regular-Change Nexus
Similarly, the complexity of using welfare to prolong a government’s tenure
can also be seen through its effect on minor regular government change,
namely, the same government remaining in office. First, transfers increase the
probability of the same party retaining office, while such a probability de-
creases income inequality. Therefore, despite the direct positive effect of wel-
fare transfers on income inequality, transfers also have an indirect effect on
income inequality, which turns out to be negative. This indirect effect is
through the channel of minor regular government change. On the one hand,
welfare transfers consolidate the power base of the ruling party and increase
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the probability of the same party remaining in power. On the other hand, the
scenario of the same party remaining in power decreases income inequality.
When the ruling party is assured of its chance of reelection into office, it will
endeavor to decrease income inequality, as it realizes that the increase of
income inequality resulting from welfare transfers may eventually backfire on
the ultimate goal of remaining in office. Examples of this scenario can be
found in some Pacific Asian countries that have had the same party in office
for a long time and have during that time practiced a strategy of “shared
growth.”35 Such countries include Singapore, Malaysia, and Taiwan. In Ma-
laysia, for instance, welfare transfers are used along with differential health
and educational expenditures, with the long-term goal of maintaining a stable
political regime along with lower levels of income inequality.36
In addition, the increase in the probability of the same party remaining
in office directly increases the probability of unconstitutional change. The
same party remaining in office could result from the lack of serious political
competition (e.g., in Botswana) or from the lack of political mechanisms for
replacing a governing party peacefully (e.g., in Zaire). If it were the latter,
then the new governing party is forced to emerge in unconstitutional manners.
Welfare transfers in this case may slow, but cannot stop, the ultimate violent
government change.
The Transfer-Inequality–Major-Regular-Change Nexus
The sign of the coefficient for welfare transfers on major regular government
change is negative (as expected), but statistically insignificant. As a result,
the lack of cross-effects between major regular government change and welfare
transfers is interesting because it indicates that the choice of changing a
political party in the constitutional framework is not affected by welfare trans-
fers alone. Structural economic variables (such as the overall level of the
economy, unemployment, and inflation) and political variables (such as the
structure of institutions and electoral rules), as well as shifts in values may
be more important than welfare transfers in altering the political party that
rules.
Major regular government change is a defining characteristic of democ-
racies. “Democracy is a regime in which some governmental offices are filled
by contested elections. . . . It is a system in which incumbents lose elections
and leave office when the rules so dictate.”37 The lack of impact of welfare
transfers or income inequality on major regular government change indicates
that under democracy a government is effectively constrained by the legis-
lature, opposition parties, and the constitution. These political mechanisms
significantly reduce the tools that a governing party can use to attain its goal
of remaining in office. Also, by definition, democracies have a large winning
coalition.38 Whoever is in office has to satisfy a wide range of society, which
limits the governing party’s power to concentrate transfers to any single social
group. Finally, income distribution is relatively equal under democracy com-
pared with autocracy, which makes redistribution less salient in the policy of
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the former compared with that of the latter.39 All told, autocratic or semide-
mocratic governments have much better leverage than their democratic coun-
terparts in using transfers to retain office.
Control Variables
Distributing resources to older segments of the population can have very
complex outcomes. An aging demographic structure tends to reduce income
inequality (as the dependent population over age 65 coefficient shows in table
1). However, the support of an older dependent population increases income
inequality as it absorbs large quantities of resources, pensions being the most
characteristic example. These resources could crowd out investment essential
for sustained economic growth and also education that not only enhances
economic growth but also reduces long-term inequalities by increasing the
opportunities of different groups to participate in the economic realm. This
argument should be emphasized, as we also find a negative impact of education
on income inequality in table 1. In addition to the direct and indirect rela-
tionships between the presence of a large older dependent population and
income inequality, it should be noted also that such a population has strong
implications for political change. Its existence is positively related to irregular
government change and negatively related to the same party staying in power.40
Among other control variables, urbanization is found to have a positive
effect on welfare transfers, which reveals that the welfare system serves the
urban areas more than the countryside. The economic side of this phenomenon
may be that urban dwellers are more sensitive to changes in their finance
(e.g., unemployment) than their rural counterparts. The political side of the
argument is that urban dwellers tend to be better educated and better organized
than their rural counterparts, thus making the former politically more valuable
to the government than the latter. This article presents evidence that rural
residents tend to fall outside welfare transfers in poor countries in particular
and provides a political rationale that accounts for the disparities between the
rural and urban areas.
China provides an interesting case in this light. D. Gale Johnson finds
that wealth disparities between rural and urban areas have not narrowed, but
perhaps widened, in China over the past 2 decades despite the rapid economic
growth that the nation has achieved.41 In addition to all the sources of dis-
parities he has identified—for example, restrictions on rural-to-urban migra-
tion, the poor quality and accessibility of rural education, and an allocation
of investment and credit biased against the countryside—our findings here
may help understand the political rationale of wealth disparities in China.
Government capacity has a negative effect on irregular government
change. This result confirms earlier findings that political violence is curbed
under a capable government, although government capacity is found to have
no effect on regular government change. Finally, the statistical results in table
1 show a strong pattern of the path dependence of political behavior. The
three kinds of government change have a salient historical pattern. The initial
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levels of government change are all statistically significant. For instance, a
coup-prone polity in 1970 tends to witness new coups. Similarly, a nation
noted for its democratic procedures in changing its government in 1970 has
largely maintained this tradition throughout the years. Those findings strongly
support the coup-trap argument.42 They also provide some robust empirical
evidence for the argument that political institutions tend to be permanent or
semipermanent.43
To conclude, the empirical results show that when welfare transfers,
income inequality, and political instability are examined together in the context
of demographic structures, governments choose to apply welfare transfers to
reduce political instability and increase their survivability. Specifically, welfare
transfers reduce political instability in two ways. First, by increasing the
probability of a minor regular government change, welfare transfers enhance
political changes that do not lead to major policy shifts. Second, through
reducing unconstitutional political changes, welfare transfers decrease the like-
lihood of the events that remove a government from office by violence.
Meanwhile, the redistribution of resources leads to an increase in income
inequality as politically salient groups absorb a large part of the redistributed
resources. We argue that welfare programs embody the incumbent’s incentive
to stay in office. They may also reflect the sources of fundamental structural
changes that alter the nature of the political and the economic system.
VI. Concluding Remarks
This article explores the interactive relationships among welfare transfers,
income distribution, and government change, controlling for the effects of
demographic and economic variables. We argue that governments are involved
in the redistribution of resources to enhance political stability and survival
rather than enhancing economic performance or wealth equality. Hence, they
tend to respond to groups that are essential for their political survival. Although
the presented empirical results are not conclusive, they tend to support our
first hypothesis—namely, that welfare transfers increase income inequality.
They also provide important insights into the relationships between welfare
transfers and three kinds of government change by testing the three other
hypotheses. Welfare transfers reduce the likelihood of irregular government
change, increase the chance of the same party remaining in office, and have
no effect on the major regular government change characteristic of democ-
racies. While the first two kinds of government change are typical of autocratic
or semidemocratic societies, the third is characteristic of democratic nations.
The implication is that the governments in the first two societies are more
capable of using welfare transfers to prolong their tenure than their democratic
counterparts. This finding is important in the sense that it provides a major
reason why many autocratic governments are long-lived (e.g., in Zaire, In-
donesia, and the Soviet Union) compared with democratic governments.
In general, governments utilize welfare transfers to alter their political
future. This goal can be successful in the long run only if it does not increase
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income inequality that can threaten the stability of the political regime. Hence,
the policy choices that a government makes to maintain political power
through redistribution of resources can be undermined by demographic struc-
tures and by the long-term effects of such redistribution of resources.
The current study can be improved in various ways. First, additional case
studies are required to improve the reliability of the statistical results. Second,
additional demographic indicators should be included, such as fertility rates
for the developing countries, so that we can further comprehend the impact
of demographic variables on income distribution and welfare transfers. Third,
other measures of welfare (e.g., health expenditures) can be included to en-
hance our understanding of the impact of state intervention on income dis-
tribution and the demographic structures within a country. Finally, while our
article indicates strong and consistent evidence that welfare transfers increase
political stability for political reasons, both welfare transfers and political
stability could be the outcome of economic development.44 Though we have
used control variables that are highly correlated with economic development,
such as an aged population and urbanization, future work may retest the
alternative hypothesis using additional economic control variables.
Appendix
Countries in the Sample
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Burkina-Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Canada
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Congo
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea Republic
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
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Myanmar
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Notes
* This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science
Foundation (SBR-9730474). We thank D. Gale Johnson and two anonymous reviewers
for their insightful comments and suggestions. We are responsible for any remaining
errors.
1. It has been pointed out that, although the expansion of the global markets and
technical advances undermine welfare programs, the changing demographic structures
are the most critical factor in determining the levels of welfare transfers. Paul Pierson,
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the power to ensure that the system is not abused. Most of the arguments favoring
state interference are based on moral and ethical considerations. The best-known ar-
gument is by John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1971).
Thus, the trade-off is between a society’s need to expand its production and the
redistribution of the production goods in a socially appropriate way. See Peter Taylor-
Gooby, “Welfare Futures,” in Social Policy in Transition: Anglo-German Perspectives
in the New European Community, ed. John Ferris and Robert Page (Aldershot: Ashgate,
1994), pp. 70–87, esp. 82–85.
6. The distinction between equal access and the amount of a service can be
summarized as follows: the former intends that everybody starts from the same point,
and the latter aims at everybody ending at the same point. See Robert Goodin and
Julian Le Grand, Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 5–8. This distinction is fundamental, because it
denotes a different philosophy regarding inequality and types of policies that govern-
ment should use to redistribute income. In the income distribution literature, one basic
argument focuses on absolute differences between the well-off and the poor. The other
position is that proportional differences should be relevant. See Goodin and Le Grand,
p. 9.
7. Flora and Heidenheimer, eds., pp. 22–25.
8. See Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State? The New Political Economy
of Welfare (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 13–14. Some
of the first specialists in the field who viewed the welfare state as a response to new
social needs can be found in Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality:
Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1975); and Goran Therborn, “Welfare State and Capitalist Markets,”
Acta Sociologica 30, no. 3–4 (1987): 237–54. Manfred Schmidt tests the relationship
between social policy development and industrialization empirically in a sample of
39 developed and underdeveloped countries. His small sample size, however, distorts
the variation that the industrialization approach could explain across countries. See
Manfred Schmidt, “Social Policy in Rich and Poor Countries: Socio-Economic Trend
and Political-Institutional Determinants,” European Journal of Political Research 17,
no. 6 (1989): 641–59.
9. Peter Flora and Jens Alber, “Modernization, Democratization, and the Devel-
opment of Welfare States in Western Europe,” in Flora and Heidenheimer, eds., pp.
39–40.
10. See, e.g., ibid.
11. In the study of government size, public choice models provide useful theo-
retical and empirical tools. Some of the public choice models target the role of the
This content downloaded from 155.245.42.48 on Fri, 12 Sep 2014 06:36:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Yi Feng and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis 233
government in redistribution, while others focus on competition among interest groups
and the role of bureaucracy and state actors. A plethora of public choice theorists have
analyzed the redistributive functions of the government. The most interesting theo-
retical work comes from Allan H. Meltzer and Scott H. Richard, “Why Government
Grows (and Grows) in a Democracy,” Public Interests 52 (1978): 111–18, and “A
Rational Theory of the Size of the Government,” Journal of Political Economy 89
(1981): 403–18; Samuel Peltzman, “The Growth of Government,” Journal of Law and
Economics 23 (1980): 209–88; Peter H. Aranson and Peter C. Ordeshook, “Regulation,
Redistribution, and Public Choice,” Public Choice 37, no. 1 (1981): 69–100. An
alternative approach points at interest groups as instrumental determinants to explain
the size of the government. The dominant figure in this area is Gordon Tullock, “Some
Problems of Majority Voting,” Journal of Political Economy 67 (1959): 571–79, with
his concept of logrolling under majority rule. Gary Becker develops an insightful
analysis in linking government functions and interest groups. See G. S. Becker, “A
Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 98 (1983): 371–400. One of the recent empirical works on the
impact of interest groups and political fractionalization on government size is by Dennis
C. Mueller and P. Murrell, “Interest Groups and the Size of Government,” Public
Choice 48, no. 2 (1986): 125–45. Other schools of thought emphasize the political or
the societal forces in the distribution of welfare transfers. See, e.g., Walter Korpi,
“Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social
Rights during Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries since 1930,” American Socio-
logical Review 54, no. 3 (1989): 309–28; Alexander Hicks and Joya Misra, “Political
Resources and the Growth of Welfare in Affluent Capitalist Democracies, 1960–1982,”
American Journal of Sociology 99 (1993): 668–710; Pampel and Williamson.
12. See, e.g., Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, “Is Inequality Harmful for
Growth? Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review 84, no. 3 (1994):
600–621.
13. Following Mancur Olson’s arguments on collective action, some public choice
theorists argue that bureaucrats respond only to well-organized groups when promoting
and protecting their budgets. For Olson’s arguments, see his seminal work, The Logic
of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965), and his macroeconomic application in The Rise and
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982). Some of the most prominent scholars focusing
on bureaucratization are W. A. Niskanen (Bureaucracy and Representative Government
[New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971], and Bureaucracy—Servant or Master? Lessons
from America [London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1973]) and Robert Bacon and
Walter A. Eltis (Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers [London: Mac-
millan, 1978]). See also Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of
Analysis in Current Research,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans,
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985), pp. 3–37; Theda Skocpol and E. Amenta, “States and Social Policies,” Annual
Review of Sociology 1, no. 1 (1986): 131–57; A. S. Orloff and T. Skocpol, “Why Not
Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain,
1990–1911, and the United States, 1880–1920,” American Sociological Review 49,
no. 6 (1984): 726–50.
14. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson,
and Alastair Smith, “Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success,” in
Governing for Prosperity, ed. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 59–84.
15. All the oil producers are excluded for being outliers. Data availability has
been a problem for Central and Eastern European countries. The political change
variables were calculated using the Penn World Tables, which do not have the data
This content downloaded from 155.245.42.48 on Fri, 12 Sep 2014 06:36:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
234 Economic Development and Cultural Change
for those countries. See Robert Summers and Alan Heston, The Penn World Trade
Mark 5.6 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995). The
welfare data are likewise unavailable for those countries.
16. William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1990), pp. 611–12. For statistical and software operational reference, see SAS Institute,
“The SYSLIN Procedure,” in SAS/ETS User’s Guide (Cary, N.C.: SAS, 1993), pp.
815–68.
17. Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Set Measuring Income Ine-
quality,” World Bank Economic Review 10 (1996): 565–91.
18. Education expenditures also function as a form of investment in human capital.
Therefore, education is not a means of income redistribution but rather a long-term
policy to achieve economic growth through the improvement of human capital.
19. Health expenditures tend to have longer and indirect effects on income dis-
tribution. Preventive health expenditures may have a strong progressive effect if they
target young cohorts. On the other hand, an increasingly older population will absorb
more pension-related and curative health resources.
20. International Monetary Fund, GFS Manual (Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 2001), p. 71.
21. Ibid., p. 72.
22. The data are provided by Summers and Heston; and International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 2000). The paucity of welfare transfers and social security data prior to 1970
reduces the years of estimation.
23. Presenting full information regarding the specification and results of the
statistical model that led to the construction of the probabilities of government change
is beyond the scope and space of our present article. For a detailed discussion and
complete specification of the estimation of the probabilities of the three kinds of
government change, see Yi Feng, “Democracy, Political Stability, and Economic
Growth,” British Journal of Political Science 27 (1997): 391–418. The results support
many priors about using these variables to estimate probabilities of government change.
Take irregular government change, for example. An increase in real GDP per capita
decreases the likelihood of irregular government change, whereas general strikes and
government crises increase the probability of such change. The variable “antigovern-
ment demonstrations” has a negative effect on irregular government change and is
statistically significant at the 10% error level. This may reflect the fact that antigov-
ernment demonstrations are a legal means by which citizens in a democracy, where
irregular government change is generally infrequent, can express their dissatisfaction
and discontent with the government. One interesting finding regarding political struc-
tures and political instability is the role played by the legislature. Irregular government
change is significantly lower where the legislature has a higher degree of responsibility
and effectiveness, suggesting that a strong and democratically elected legislature in-
hibits irregular government change. The size of the cabinet also reduces the likelihood
of an irregular government change. The number of officials at the ministerial level in
an executive branch may indicate a mature bureaucratic system with well-defined
divisions of labor, which should reduce those irregularities that breed political insta-
bility. Finally, countries with a premier as the executive and oil-producing countries
tend to have a higher level of irregular government change than otherwise. The prob-
ability variables thus created have been used in numerous publications. For instance,
see Baizhu Chen and Yi Feng, “Some Political Determinants of Economic Growth,”
European Journal of Political Economy 12 (1996): 609–27; Yi Feng, “Democracy,
Political Stability, and Economic Growth”; and Yi Feng, Jacek Kugler, and Paul J.
Zak, “The Politics of Fertility and Economic Development,” International Studies
Quarterly 44 (2000): 667–93.
24. United Nations, World Population Perspectives (New York: United Nations,
This content downloaded from 155.245.42.48 on Fri, 12 Sep 2014 06:36:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Yi Feng and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis 235
1982), and The World Data of Social and Economic Information (New York: United
Nations, 1994).
25. See Summers and Heston (n. 15 above).
26. The teacher-pupil ratio, which is another measurement, captures the quality
of education. A lower ratio implies lower quality in education. Finally, literacy rates
are another alternative, which provide information as to the stock of human capital
rather than the flow of investment.
27. Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, “International Comparisons of Educational
Attainment,” Working Paper no. 5658 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1993). The data are in 5-year intervals from 1960 to 1985. They were
averaged from 1970 to 1985 in this study.
28. Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2001–2002 (New York: Freedom
House, 2002).
29. See Raymond Gastil, Freedom in the World (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood,
1982).
30. See Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, “Power Parity, Democracy, and the
Severity of Internal Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1998): 196–209.
31. Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, “Relative Political Capacity: Political
Extraction and Political Reach,” in Political Capacity and Economic Behavior, ed.
Marina Arbetman and Jacek Kugler (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998), pp. 11–46.
32. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, “When Bad Economics Is
Good Politics,” in de Mesquita and Root, eds. (n. 14 above); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,
James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “International Conflict
and Democratic Transitions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43 (1999): 147–61.
33. In our estimation, we tried continent dummy variables, but they were statis-
tically insignificant. The political change variables represent the continent variation
to a large degree, as we used the continent dummy variables to estimate the probabilities
of government change. The political change variables already contain the continental
information.
34. Mark Irving Lichbach, “An Evaluation of ‘Does Economic Inequality Breed
Political Conflict?’” World Politics 41, no. 4 (1989): 431–70; Will H. Moore, Ronny
Lindstro¨m, and Valerie O’Regan, “Land Reform, Political Violence and the Economic
Inequality Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis,” International Inter-
actions 21, no. 4 (1996): 353–63..
35. For the concept of “shared growth,” see Jose Edgardo Campos and Hilton
L. Root, The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible (Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996).
36. For a case study of Malaysia, see Yi Feng, Ismene Gizelis, and Jae Hoon
Lee, “Managing Economic Development in the Presence of Ethnic Diversity: The
Malaysian Experience,” in Managing Economic Development in Asia, ed. Thomas K.
Liou (London: Praeger, 2002), pp. 203–38.
37. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose´ Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando
Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the
World, 1950–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 35, 54.
38. See de Mesquita et al. (n. 14 above).
39. Yi Feng, Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance: Theory and
Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
40. For a discussion on how demographic changes may affect the structures of
the welfare state in European countries, see Gosta Epsing-Andersen, “Interview on
Postindustrialism and the Future of the Welfare State,” Work, Employment, and Society
14 (2000): 757–69.
41. D. Gale Johnson, “Agricultural Adjustment in China: Problems and Pros-
pects,” Population and Development Review 26, no. 2 (2000): 319–34. We also thank
a reviewer for suggesting China as an example to illustrate our findings.
This content downloaded from 155.245.42.48 on Fri, 12 Sep 2014 06:36:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
236 Economic Development and Cultural Change
42. See John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the
Seizure of Executive Power,” World Politics 32 (1990): 151–83.
43. See Alex Cukierman, Sebastian Edwards, and Guido Tabellini, “Seigniorage
and Political Instability,” American Economic Review 82 (1992): 537–55; Alberto
Alesina, Sule Ozler, Nouriel Roubini, and Philip Swagel, “Political Instability and
Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1996): 189–212.
44. We owe this observation to a reviewer.
This content downloaded from 155.245.42.48 on Fri, 12 Sep 2014 06:36:27 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
